BY JEANNINE KORANDA
SOURCE: The Wichita (KS) Eagle, Topeka Bureau

The Legislature should not back away from requiring ignition interlock systems for first-time drunken drivers, Mothers Against Drunk Driving said Monday.

That requirement was stripped by a conference committee Friday from a bill approved earlier in the week by a unanimous House.

MADD urged the House to reject the change.

“Lawmakers should do everything possible to reduce drunk driving and save lives,” said Frank Harris, state legislative affairs manager for MADD on Monday.

But Sen. Tim Owens, R-Overland Park, who chairs the Kansas DUI Commission, urged patience.

The commission, established last year, has undertaken a comprehensive overhaul of the state’s DUI laws and is expected to propose a package of changes next year. Wait for that instead of tinkering with small changes now, Owens said.

“To do all these little piecemeal changes is exactly the problem we have had in getting our DUI law the way it is right now,” he said. “I’ve requested we not have all of those little changes made. Even though they might be good, they aren’t ready for the comprehensive bill.”

Currently, interlock devices are required for drivers who are convicted of a second drunken-driving offense, who refuse a Breathalyzer test or who are caught with a 0.15 blood alcohol level — almost twice the legal limit of 0.08.

The interlock devices won’t allow the car to start if the driver’s blood alcohol level is half the legal limit or greater. The driver’s levels also are randomly tested while the car is moving. The devices cost $50 to $70 for installation and $65 to $75 a month in fees after that.

The bill had proposed that first-time offenders use an ignition interlock device for one year and that subsequent offenses trigger an increase in the number of years the devices must be used.

Requiring ignition interlock systems for first-time drunken driving convictions could reduce drunken driving fatalities by 30 percent and decrease the number of people with multiple drunken driving convictions, Harris said.

Twelve states, including Nebraska and Colorado, require ignition interlock devices for those convicted of a first drunken driving offense.

Requirements for ignition interlocks are part of the commission’s discussion, Owens said, but the final details might not be the same as the House’s proposal.

Lawmakers created the commission in 2009 shortly after the Kansas Substance Abuse Policy Board concluded that the state’s DUI laws were so complex and dysfunctional that the system needed a complete overhaul.

The commission came six months after Claudia Mijares and her 4-year-old daughter, Gisele, were killed by a drunken driver while walking across the street to a Wichita school.

Gary Hammitt had four DUI convictions, but still had a valid driver’s license. He pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison.

Harris said there might not be much harm in waiting an additional six months for the commission to propose its changes, “but the longer they wait, the longer the people of Kansas are not afforded a basic protection.”

He noted that Kansas was one of the few states to see an increase in drunken driving fatalities in 2009, when the numbers decreased nationally.

A report prepared by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration found that Kansas’ overall fatality rate dropped from 1.38 to 1.30 deaths per 100 million miles traveled. But the number of alcohol-related deaths rose from 0.36 to 0.49 per 100 million miles traveled.

Kansas’ 36.1 percent year-to-year increase was second only to the 40.0 percent jump recorded in New Hampshire.

“We are stubborn on this for all the right reasons, and we just want to see whatever can be done now to save lives,” Harris said.
***************************************************
To see how the device operates…..
Watch the Video HERE

More than 400 defense DUI motions were denied by a panel of seven judges who ruled that sobriety testing devices used were in fact federally approved ones, according to the State Attorney’s Office on Monday.

This was the third unsuccessful challenge to the Intoxilyzer 8000 breath instrument since 2005. The cases of defendants, who were looking to suppress breath test results and have their DUI cases tossed, will now proceed through the court system.

“The court, in seven county judges’ orders, reaffirmed the long-standing law enforcement practice of using the Intoxilyzer 8000 as a tool to measure alcohol in a driver’s blood,” said State Attorney Michael McAuliffe in a statement. “This tool is used to ensure the safety of those on the roads in Palm Beach County.”

The judges unanimously ruled that evidence determined that the Intoxilyzer was properly tested by the Department of Transportation and has been a “conforming product” since 2002.

In Florida, the alcohol-screening device has been in use since 2006.

Defendants also said officers who inspected and maintained the machines intentionally destroyed evidence of failed inspections by unplugging the Intoxilyzers when it looked as if they wouldn’t pass. These tests ensure the machines’ accuracy.

But the judges ruled that evidence was not established to show Intoxilyzer inspectors “intentionally and maliciously destroyed” failed inspection results.

Lead defense attorney in the case, Ira Karmelin, said he respected the judges’ ruling, but found the burden placed on defendants to be challenging.

“It’s an extremely high and difficult burden … You’re trying to prove a negative,” he said.

Contact us for a free consultation.

SOURCE

SHERIDAN, Wyo. (AP) – Mayor Dave Kinskey passed a sobriety test after a phoned-in tip that said he may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. After he was pulled over Saturday night and passed the field sobriety test, Kinskey had his attorney drive him to a hospital, where he had a blood-alcohol test at his own expense. The test showed that his blood-alcohol level was 0.02 percent, according to Police Chief Mike Card…. City Councilwoman Kathy Kennedy said she was with Kinskey at a motorcycle rally Saturday and saw him drink two beers over two hours. ‘’To me this is just a smear campaign to try to get at him due to politics. I think it is pretty bad when an off-duty city employee calls in to smear the mayor by saying he was intoxicated when he wasn’t,’’ Kennedy said.

New York City, March 8, 2010-All of the 55 NYPD cops charged with drunk driving since 1999 pleaded down to non-felony charges and almost every single one of them remained on the force. Although the NYPD can fire any cop “who causes serious physical injury to another person while operating a motor vehicle and is determined to be unfit for duty due to the consumption of alcohol,” a Daily News investigation reveals that officers accused of drunk driving often keep their jobs after pleading guilty to lesser offenses like driving while impaired or disorderly conduct.

An NYPD spokesman said officers convicted of felonies are automatically fired, but those who plead down or are convicted of misdemeanors can be punished with suspension, loss of vacation days, alcohol counseling, and probation. Several cops have been accused of drunk driving in recent months, including Officer Andrew Kelly, who hit and killed a preacher’s daughter, Detective Kevin Spellman, who hit and killed a Bronx grandmother, and other cops who crashed into a Tiffany’s store and struck a parked car.

Some cops accused of drunk driving, like Officer Donald Haines, say they’re lucky they’re still on the force. Haines—who joined the NYPD although he had pleaded guilty to driving impaired in 1998—was charged with drunk driving for jumping a curb in Long Island in 2007. After refusing to take a sobriety test and a chemical test, he pleaded guilty to another count of driving while impaired and was ordered to perform 50 hours of community service and pay a $1,000 fine. “All I can say is, I still have my job and I’m very grateful,” he said.

Others, like retired detective Daniel Massanova, were unrepentant. Five years before retiring with a pension in January, Massanova pleaded guilty to driving impaired after swerving into oncoming traffic and colliding with another car, injuring two women. He refused a Breathalyzer at the scene and was later found to have a blood alcohol level of .11. “Two girls hit me. … They weren’t two old ladies coming home from BINGO, you know what I mean? They were out drinking and drugging,” he said. “If I was such a bad guy, why did I work the last 2-1/2 years in the chief of detectives office unsupervised and alone?” he asked. “I had a couple beers in me and I’m the bad guy because I’m a cop.

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES

Chapter 316
STATE UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL

View Entire Chapter

316.1932 Tests for alcohol, chemical substances, or controlled substances; implied consent; refusal.–

(1)(a)1.a. Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state is, by so operating such vehicle, deemed to have given his or her consent to submit to an approved chemical test or physical test including, but not limited to, an infrared light test of his or her breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood or breath if the person is lawfully arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The chemical or physical breath test must be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at the request of a law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such person was driving or was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The administration of a breath test does not preclude the administration of another type of test. The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to any lawful test of his or her breath will result in the suspension of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 1 year for a first refusal, or for a period of 18 months if the driving privilege of such person has been previously suspended as a result of a refusal to submit to such a test or tests, and shall also be told that if he or she refuses to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath and his or her driving privilege has been previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, he or she commits a misdemeanor in addition to any other penalties. The refusal to submit to a chemical or physical breath test upon the request of a law enforcement officer as provided in this section is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding.

b. Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state is, by so operating such vehicle, deemed to have given his or her consent to submit to a urine test for the purpose of detecting the presence of chemical substances as set forth in s. 877.111 or controlled substances if the person is lawfully arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of chemical substances or controlled substances. The urine test must be incidental to a lawful arrest and administered at a detention facility or any other facility, mobile or otherwise, which is equipped to administer such tests at the request of a law enforcement officer who has reasonable cause to believe such person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of chemical substances or controlled substances. The urine test shall be administered at a detention facility or any other facility, mobile or otherwise, which is equipped to administer such test in a reasonable manner that will ensure the accuracy of the specimen and maintain the privacy of the individual involved. The administration of a urine test does not preclude the administration of another type of test. The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to any lawful test of his or her urine will result in the suspension of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 1 year for the first refusal, or for a period of 18 months if the driving privilege of such person has been previously suspended as a result of a refusal to submit to such a test or tests, and shall also be told that if he or she refuses to submit to a lawful test of his or her urine and his or her driving privilege has been previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, he or she commits a misdemeanor in addition to any other penalties. The refusal to submit to a urine test upon the request of a law enforcement officer as provided in this section is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding.

2. The Alcohol Testing Program within the Department of Law Enforcement is responsible for the regulation of the operation, inspection, and registration of breath test instruments utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program is responsible for the regulation of the individuals who operate, inspect, and instruct on the breath test instruments utilized in the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program is further responsible for the regulation of blood analysts who conduct blood testing to be utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The program shall:

a. Establish uniform criteria for the issuance of permits to breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments.

b. Have the authority to permit breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments.

c. Have the authority to discipline and suspend, revoke, or renew the permits of breath test operators, agency inspectors, instructors, blood analysts, and instruments.

d. Establish uniform requirements for instruction and curricula for the operation and inspection of approved instruments.

e. Have the authority to specify one approved curriculum for the operation and inspection of approved instruments.

f. Establish a procedure for the approval of breath test operator and agency inspector classes.

g. Have the authority to approve or disapprove breath test instruments and accompanying paraphernalia for use pursuant to the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327.

h. With the approval of the executive director of the Department of Law Enforcement, make and enter into contracts and agreements with other agencies, organizations, associations, corporations, individuals, or federal agencies as are necessary, expedient, or incidental to the performance of duties.

i. Issue final orders which include findings of fact and conclusions of law and which constitute final agency action for the purpose of chapter 120.

j. Enforce compliance with the provisions of this section through civil or administrative proceedings.

k. Make recommendations concerning any matter within the purview of this section, this chapter, chapter 322, or chapter 327.

l. Promulgate rules for the administration and implementation of this section, including definitions of terms.

m. Consult and cooperate with other entities for the purpose of implementing the mandates of this section.

n. Have the authority to approve the type of blood test utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327.

o. Have the authority to specify techniques and methods for breath alcohol testing and blood testing utilized under the driving and boating under the influence provisions and related provisions located in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327.

p. Have the authority to approve repair facilities for the approved breath test instruments, including the authority to set criteria for approval.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede provisions in this chapter and chapters 322 and 327. The specifications in this section are derived from the power and authority previously and currently possessed by the Department of Law Enforcement and are enumerated to conform with the mandates of chapter 99-379, Laws of Florida.

(b)1. The blood-alcohol level must be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. The breath-alcohol level must be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

2. An analysis of a person’s breath, in order to be considered valid under this section, must have been performed substantially according to methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement. For this purpose, the department may approve satisfactory techniques or methods. Any insubstantial differences between approved techniques and actual testing procedures in any individual case do not render the test or test results invalid.

(c) Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state is, by operating such vehicle, deemed to have given his or her consent to submit to an approved blood test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the blood or a blood test for the purpose of determining the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances as provided in this section if there is reasonable cause to believe the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances and the person appears for treatment at a hospital, clinic, or other medical facility and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or impossible. As used in this paragraph, the term “other medical facility” includes an ambulance or other medical emergency vehicle. The blood test shall be performed in a reasonable manner. Any person who is incapable of refusal by reason of unconsciousness or other mental or physical condition is deemed not to have withdrawn his or her consent to such test. A blood test may be administered whether or not the person is told that his or her failure to submit to such a blood test will result in the suspension of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state and that a refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her blood, if his or her driving privilege has been previously suspended for refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, is a misdemeanor. Any person who is capable of refusal shall be told that his or her failure to submit to such a blood test will result in the suspension of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 1 year for a first refusal, or for a period of 18 months if the driving privilege of the person has been suspended previously as a result of a refusal to submit to such a test or tests, and that a refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her blood, if his or her driving privilege has been previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit to a lawful test of his or her breath, urine, or blood, is a misdemeanor. The refusal to submit to a blood test upon the request of a law enforcement officer is admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding.

(d) If the arresting officer does not request a chemical or physical breath test of the person arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances, such person may request the arresting officer to have a chemical or physical test made of the arrested person’s breath or a test of the urine or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person’s blood or breath or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances; and, if so requested, the arresting officer shall have the test performed.

(e)1. By applying for a driver’s license and by accepting and using a driver’s license, the person holding the driver’s license is deemed to have expressed his or her consent to the provisions of this section.

2. A nonresident or any other person driving in a status exempt from the requirements of the driver’s license law, by his or her act of driving in such exempt status, is deemed to have expressed his or her consent to the provisions of this section.

3. A warning of the consent provision of this section shall be printed on each new or renewed driver’s license.

(f)1. The tests determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood or breath shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer substantially in accordance with rules of the Department of Law Enforcement. Such rules must specify precisely the test or tests that are approved by the Department of Law Enforcement for reliability of result and ease of administration, and must provide an approved method of administration which must be followed in all such tests given under this section. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood does not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes.

2.a. Only a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician, acting at the request of a law enforcement officer, may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining its alcoholic content or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances therein. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood does not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes.

b. Notwithstanding any provision of law pertaining to the confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records, if a health care provider, who is providing medical care in a health care facility to a person injured in a motor vehicle crash, becomes aware, as a result of any blood test performed in the course of that medical treatment, that the person’s blood-alcohol level meets or exceeds the blood-alcohol level specified in s. 316.193(1)(b), the health care provider may notify any law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency. Any such notice must be given within a reasonable time after the health care provider receives the test result. Any such notice shall be used only for the purpose of providing the law enforcement officer with reasonable cause to request the withdrawal of a blood sample pursuant to this section.

c. The notice shall consist only of the name of the person being treated, the name of the person who drew the blood, the blood-alcohol level indicated by the test, and the date and time of the administration of the test.

d. Nothing contained in s. 395.3025(4), s. 456.057, or any applicable practice act affects the authority to provide notice under this section, and the health care provider is not considered to have breached any duty owed to the person under s. 395.3025(4), s. 456.057, or any applicable practice act by providing notice or failing to provide notice. It shall not be a breach of any ethical, moral, or legal duty for a health care provider to provide notice or fail to provide notice.

e. A civil, criminal, or administrative action may not be brought against any person or health care provider participating in good faith in the provision of notice or failure to provide notice as provided in this section. Any person or health care provider participating in the provision of notice or failure to provide notice as provided in this section shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability and from any professional disciplinary action with respect to the provision of notice or failure to provide notice under this section. Any such participant has the same immunity with respect to participating in any judicial proceedings resulting from the notice or failure to provide notice.

3. The person tested may, at his or her own expense, have a physician, registered nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician, or other person of his or her own choosing administer an independent test in addition to the test administered at the direction of the law enforcement officer for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances at the time alleged, as shown by chemical analysis of his or her blood or urine, or by chemical or physical test of his or her breath. The failure or inability to obtain an independent test by a person does not preclude the admissibility in evidence of the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer. The law enforcement officer shall not interfere with the person’s opportunity to obtain the independent test and shall provide the person with timely telephone access to secure the test, but the burden is on the person to arrange and secure the test at the person’s own expense.

4. Upon the request of the person tested, full information concerning the results of the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made available to the person or his or her attorney. Full information is limited to the following:

a. The type of test administered and the procedures followed.

b. The time of the collection of the blood or breath sample analyzed.

c. The numerical results of the test indicating the alcohol content of the blood and breath.

d. The type and status of any permit issued by the Department of Law Enforcement which was held by the person who performed the test.

e. If the test was administered by means of a breath testing instrument, the date of performance of the most recent required inspection of such instrument.

Full information does not include manuals, schematics, or software of the instrument used to test the person or any other material that is not in the actual possession of the state. Additionally, full information does not include information in the possession of the manufacturer of the test instrument.

5. A hospital, clinical laboratory, medical clinic, or similar medical institution or physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician, or other person assisting a law enforcement officer does not incur any civil or criminal liability as a result of the withdrawal or analysis of a blood or urine specimen, or the chemical or physical test of a person’s breath pursuant to accepted medical standards when requested by a law enforcement officer, regardless of whether or not the subject resisted administration of the test.

(2) The results of any test administered pursuant to this section for the purpose of detecting the presence of any controlled substance shall not be admissible as evidence in a criminal prosecution for the possession of a controlled substance.

(3) Notwithstanding any provision of law pertaining to the confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records, information relating to the alcoholic content of the blood or breath or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances in the blood obtained pursuant to this section shall be released to a court, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, or law enforcement officer in connection with an alleged violation of s. 316.193 upon request for such information.

History.–s. 3, ch. 82-155; s. 3, ch. 82-403; s. 1, ch. 83-218; s. 4, ch. 83-228; s. 3, ch. 84-359; s. 2, ch. 86-296; s. 3, ch. 88-5; s. 1, ch. 88-82; s. 2, ch. 91-255; s. 20, ch. 92-58; s. 314, ch. 95-148; s. 4, ch. 96-330; s. 1, ch. 98-27; s. 6, ch. 2000-160; s. 1, ch. 2000-226; s. 2, ch. 2002-263; s. 1, ch. 2003-54; s. 33, ch. 2005-164; s. 1, ch. 2006-247.

Title XXIII
MOTOR VEHICLES

Chapter 316
STATE UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL

View Entire Chapter

316.193 Driving under the influence; penalties.–

(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person’s normal faculties are impaired;

(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or

(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), subsection (3), or subsection (4), any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) shall be punished:

1. By a fine of:

a. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a first conviction.

b. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a second conviction; and

2. By imprisonment for:

a. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.

b. Not more than 9 months for a second conviction.

3. For a second conviction, by mandatory placement for a period of at least 1 year, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

(b)1. Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs within 10 years after a prior conviction for a violation of this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of not less than 2 years, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

2. Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs more than 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for a violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,000 or more than $5,000 and by imprisonment for not more than 12 months. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of at least 2 years, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

3. Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section, regardless of when any prior conviction for a violation of this section occurred, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, the fine imposed for such fourth or subsequent violation may be not less than $2,000.

(3) Any person:

(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);

(b) Who operates a vehicle; and

(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or contributes to causing:

1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

3. The death of any human being or unborn quick child commits DUI manslaughter, and commits:

a. A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

b. A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:

(I) At the time of the crash, the person knew, or should have known, that the crash occurred; and

(II) The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.

For purposes of this subsection, the definition of the term “unborn quick child” shall be determined in accordance with the definition of viable fetus as set forth in s. 782.071. A person who is convicted of DUI manslaughter shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years.

(4) Any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15 or higher, or any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who at the time of the offense was accompanied in the vehicle by a person under the age of 18 years, shall be punished:

(a) By a fine of:

1. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a first conviction.

2. Not less than $2,000 or more than $4,000 for a second conviction.

3. Not less than $4,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.

(b) By imprisonment for:

1. Not more than 9 months for a first conviction.

2. Not more than 12 months for a second conviction.

For the purposes of this subsection, only the instant offense is required to be a violation of subsection (1) by a person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.15 or higher.

(c) In addition to the penalties in paragraphs (a) and (b), the court shall order the mandatory placement, at the convicted person’s sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person for not less than 6 continuous months for the first offense and for not less than 2 continuous years for a second offense, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license.

(5) The court shall place all offenders convicted of violating this section on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a substance abuse course conducted by a DUI program licensed by the department under s. 322.292, which must include a psychosocial evaluation of the offender. If the DUI program refers the offender to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse treatment, in addition to any sentence or fine imposed under this section, completion of all such education, evaluation, and treatment is a condition of reporting probation. The offender shall assume reasonable costs for such education, evaluation, and treatment. The referral to treatment resulting from a psychosocial evaluation shall not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program’s psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver. The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. The term “substance abuse” means the abuse of alcohol or any substance named or described in Schedules I through V of s. 893.03. If an offender referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such treatment or fails to complete the DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of the notice, the department shall cancel the offender’s driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification from the DUI program that the offender is currently participating in treatment and the DUI education course and evaluation requirement has been completed. If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of completion of treatment from the DUI program. The organization that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation may not provide required substance abuse treatment unless a waiver has been granted to that organization by the department. A waiver may be granted only if the department determines, in accordance with its rules, that the service provider that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation is the most appropriate service provider and is licensed under chapter 397 or is exempt from such licensure. A statistical referral report shall be submitted quarterly to the department by each organization authorized to provide services under this section.

(6) With respect to any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1), regardless of any penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4):

(a) For the first conviction, the court shall place the defendant on probation for a period not to exceed 1 year and, as a condition of such probation, shall order the defendant to participate in public service or a community work project for a minimum of 50 hours. The court may order a defendant to pay a fine of $10 for each hour of public service or community work otherwise required only if the court finds that the residence or location of the defendant at the time public service or community work is required or the defendant’s employment obligations would create an undue hardship for the defendant. However, the total period of probation and incarceration may not exceed 1 year. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle that was operated by or in the actual control of the defendant or any one vehicle registered in the defendant’s name at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 10 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 10 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h).

(b) For the second conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 5 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 10 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 30 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 30 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver’s license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)2. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(c) For the third or subsequent conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 30 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 90 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 90 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver’s license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)3. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(d) The court must at the time of sentencing the defendant issue an order for the impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle. The order of impoundment or immobilization must include the name and telephone numbers of all immobilization agencies meeting all of the conditions of subsection (13). Within 7 business days after the date that the court issues the order of impoundment or immobilization, the clerk of the court must send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the registered owner of each vehicle, if the registered owner is a person other than the defendant, and to each person of record claiming a lien against the vehicle.

(e) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred may submit to the court a police report indicating that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the offense or documentation of having purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed from an entity other than the defendant or the defendant’s agent. If the court finds that the vehicle was stolen or that the sale was not made to circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs. If the court denies the request to dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization, the petitioner may request an evidentiary hearing.

(f) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred, and whose vehicle was stolen or who purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed directly from the defendant or the defendant’s agent, may request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the impoundment or immobilization should occur. If the court finds that either the vehicle was stolen or the purchase was made without knowledge of the offense, that the purchaser had no relationship to the defendant other than through the transaction, and that such purchase would not circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs.

(g) The court shall also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle if the court finds that the family of the owner of the vehicle has no other private or public means of transportation.

(h) The court may also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of any vehicles that are owned by the defendant but that are operated solely by the employees of the defendant or any business owned by the defendant.

(i) All costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization, including the cost of notification, must be paid by the owner of the vehicle or, if the vehicle is leased or rented, by the person leasing or renting the vehicle, unless the impoundment or immobilization order is dismissed. All provisions of s. 713.78 shall apply. The costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization must be paid directly to the person impounding or immobilizing the vehicle.

(j) The person who owns a vehicle that is impounded or immobilized under this paragraph, or a person who has a lien of record against such a vehicle and who has not requested a review of the impoundment pursuant to paragraph (e), paragraph (f), or paragraph (g), may, within 10 days after the date that person has knowledge of the location of the vehicle, file a complaint in the county in which the owner resides to determine whether the vehicle was wrongfully taken or withheld from the owner or lienholder. Upon the filing of a complaint, the owner or lienholder may have the vehicle released by posting with the court a bond or other adequate security equal to the amount of the costs and fees for impoundment or immobilization, including towing or storage, to ensure the payment of such costs and fees if the owner or lienholder does not prevail. When the bond is posted and the fee is paid as set forth in s. 28.24, the clerk of the court shall issue a certificate releasing the vehicle. At the time of release, after reasonable inspection, the owner or lienholder must give a receipt to the towing or storage company indicating any loss or damage to the vehicle or to the contents of the vehicle.

(k) A defendant, in the court’s discretion, may be required to serve all or any portion of a term of imprisonment to which the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to this section in a residential alcoholism treatment program or a residential drug abuse treatment program. Any time spent in such a program must be credited by the court toward the term of imprisonment.

For the purposes of this section, any conviction for a violation of s. 327.35; a previous conviction for the violation of former s. 316.1931, former s. 860.01, or former s. 316.028; or a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, driving with an unlawful breath-alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense, is also considered a previous conviction for violation of this section. However, in satisfaction of the fine imposed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon a finding that the defendant is financially unable to pay either all or part of the fine, order that the defendant participate for a specified additional period of time in public service or a community work project in lieu of payment of that portion of the fine which the court determines the defendant is unable to pay. In determining such additional sentence, the court shall consider the amount of the unpaid portion of the fine and the reasonable value of the services to be ordered; however, the court may not compute the reasonable value of services at a rate less than the federal minimum wage at the time of sentencing.

(7) A conviction under this section does not bar any civil suit for damages against the person so convicted.

(8) At the arraignment, or in conjunction with any notice of arraignment provided by the clerk of the court, the clerk shall provide any person charged with a violation of this section with notice that upon conviction the court shall suspend or revoke the offender’s driver’s license and that the offender should make arrangements for transportation at any proceeding in which the court may take such action. Failure to provide such notice does not affect the court’s suspension or revocation of the offender’s driver’s license.

(9) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section may not be released from custody:

(a) Until the person is no longer under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893 and affected to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired;

(b) Until the person’s blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05; or

(c) Until 8 hours have elapsed from the time the person was arrested.

(10) The rulings of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under s. 322.2615 shall not be considered in any trial for a violation of this section. Testimony or evidence from the administrative proceedings or any written statement submitted by a person in his or her request for administrative review is inadmissible into evidence or for any other purpose in any criminal proceeding, unless timely disclosed in criminal discovery pursuant to Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(11) The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation of the use of ignition interlock devices.

(12) If the records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles show that the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence, that evidence is sufficient by itself to establish that prior conviction for driving under the influence. However, such evidence may be contradicted or rebutted by other evidence. This presumption may be considered along with any other evidence presented in deciding whether the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence.

(13) If personnel of the circuit court or the sheriff do not immobilize vehicles, only immobilization agencies that meet the conditions of this subsection shall immobilize vehicles in that judicial circuit.

(a) The immobilization agency responsible for immobilizing vehicles in that judicial circuit shall be subject to strict compliance with all of the following conditions and restrictions:

1. Any immobilization agency engaged in the business of immobilizing vehicles shall:

a. Have a class “R” license issued pursuant to part IV of chapter 493;

b. Have at least 3 years of verifiable experience in immobilizing vehicles; and

c. Maintain accurate and complete records of all payments for the immobilization, copies of all documents pertaining to the court’s order of impoundment or immobilization, and any other documents relevant to each immobilization. Such records must be maintained by the immobilization agency for at least 3 years.

2. The person who immobilizes a vehicle must never have been convicted of any felony or of driving or boating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in the last 3 years.

(b) A person who violates paragraph (a) commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(c) Any immobilization agency who is aggrieved by a person’s violation of paragraph (a) may bring a civil action against the person who violated paragraph (a) seeking injunctive relief, damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any other remedy available at law or in equity as may be necessary to enforce this subsection. In any action to enforce this subsection, establishment of a violation of paragraph (a) shall conclusively establish a clear legal right to injunctive relief, that irreparable harm will be caused if an injunction does not issue, that no adequate remedy at law exists, and that public policy favors issuance of injunctive relief.

(14) As used in this chapter, the term:

(a) “Immobilization,” “immobilizing,” or “immobilize” means the act of installing a vehicle antitheft device on the steering wheel of a vehicle, the act of placing a tire lock or wheel clamp on a vehicle, or a governmental agency’s act of taking physical possession of the license tag and vehicle registration rendering a vehicle legally inoperable to prevent any person from operating the vehicle pursuant to an order of impoundment or immobilization under subsection (6).

(b) “Immobilization agency” or “immobilization agencies” means any firm, company, agency, organization, partnership, corporation, association, trust, or other business entity of any kind whatsoever that meets all of the conditions of subsection (13).

(c) “Impoundment,” “impounding,” or “impound” means the act of storing a vehicle at a storage facility pursuant to an order of impoundment or immobilization under subsection (6) where the person impounding the vehicle exercises control, supervision, and responsibility over the vehicle.

(d) “Person” means any individual, firm, company, agency, organization, partnership, corporation, association, trust, or other business entity of any kind whatsoever.

History.–s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 19, ch. 73-331; s. 1, ch. 74-384; s. 1, ch. 76-31; s. 1, ch. 79-408; s. 1, ch. 80-343; s. 2, ch. 82-155; s. 1, ch. 82-403; s. 2, ch. 83-187; s. 1, ch. 83-228; s. 1, ch. 84-359; s. 24, ch. 85-167; s. 2, ch. 85-337; s. 1, ch. 86-296; s. 2, ch. 88-5; s. 5, ch. 88-82; s. 8, ch. 88-196; s. 8, ch. 88-324; s. 60, ch. 88-381; s. 7, ch. 89-3; ss. 1, 18, ch. 91-255; s. 32, ch. 92-78; ss. 1, 11, ch. 93-124; s. 3, ch. 93-246; s. 1, ch. 94-324; s. 895, ch. 95-148; s. 1, ch. 95-186; s. 4, ch. 95-333; s. 12, ch. 95-408; s. 3, ch. 96-330; s. 2, ch. 96-413; s. 48, ch. 97-100; s. 97, ch. 97-264; s. 25, ch. 97-271; ss. 6, 13, ch. 98-324; s. 5, ch. 99-234; s. 139, ch. 99-248; s. 4, ch. 2000-313; s. 10, ch. 2000-320; s. 2, ch. 2002-78; s. 1, ch. 2002-263; s. 1, ch. 2004-379; s. 1, ch. 2005-119; s. 3, ch. 2007-211; s. 29, ch. 2008-111; s. 5, ch. 2008-176; s. 5, ch. 2009-138; s. 10, ch. 2009-206.

Note.–Former s. 316.028.

BY CRISTINA SILVA
Herald/Times Tallahassee Bureau

TALLAHASSEE — Momentum is building for a measure that would ban text messaging while driving, but legislators are still ironing out just how far the proposed law should go.

After more than an hour of heated debate, a House committee unanimously pushed forward a bill Wednesday that stopped short of making texting while driving a primary offense. So a police officer would need another reason to stop a driver and write a citation.

Lawmakers acknowledged some compromise had softened the bill language, but supporters stressed that passing any law would be better than taking no action.

“When you are offered a ham sandwich, sometimes it is better to take the ham sandwich than wait for the steak that never comes,” said Rep. Gary Aubuchon, R-Cape Coral, chair of the Roads, Bridges and Ports Policy Committee.

The texting talk puts Florida at the center of a national debate about telecommunication devices and road safety.

At least 19 states and the District of Columbia have passed bans on texting while driving in recent years.

Distractions caused by mobile devices contribute to 6,000 deaths each year on America’s highways, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.

More than 135 billion text messages were sent or received in a one-month period in the United States, an 80 percent increase over the rate in 2008, the department found.

SECONDARY OFFENSE

Florida’s proposed law would make texting while driving a secondary offense. The measure also prohibits motorists from reading data on wireless devices while driving.

First-time violators could face fines of $30 plus court costs. A second offense within five years would be a moving violation, costing the texting driver $60 plus court costs.

TOUGH ENOUGH?

The bill, pushed by Rep. Doug Holder, R-Sarasota, initially proposed making texting while driving a more serious offense.

Holder said he was comfortable with the new bill language.

“From what I am hearing, if we made this a primary offense there would be so much opposition that the bill would never be heard again,” he said.

Still, some proponents said they wanted to see a stronger bill reach the House floor.

“The easiest thing for law enforcement is to be able to say it is illegal to hold a piece of [telecommunications] equipment in your hand,” said Rep. Julio Robaina, R-Miami.

Police officers might not be able to differentiate between drivers dialing a telephone call or texting a message without a clearer idea of what to look for, said Rep. Audrey Gibson, D-Jacksonville.

“I don’t know what they [the drivers] are going to take to court to prove they are not texting,” she said.

Holder urged lawmakers to trust law enforcement officers to do their jobs.

“The intention of this bill is to save lives in Florida by prohibiting texting while driving so we can reduce deaths and accidents,” he said. “The purpose of the bill is not to enact a law in order to pull someone over and write a citation.”

More than a dozen similar bills have been pitched in the House and Senate this year, but Holder’s measure has received the most support thus far. That doesn’t sit well with lawmakers pushing for broader enforcement.

“How many lives do we have to lose before they get that this is a very serious deal?” said Rep. Janet Long, D-Seminole, who vowed to fight for a stricter ban. “It ain’t over until it is over.”

Cristina Silva can be reached at csilva@sptimes.com.

Find My Profile Here

The debate over the minimum drinking age has continued for decades, with the recent focus being on whether it makes sense to send American youth to fight and perhaps die in foreign countries but not to drink alcohol.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving, ever vigilant in its Prohibitionist goals , has fought hard (and successfully) against exposing our troops to the evils of alcohol.

A second front, long simmering, has now errupted: the drinking age for college students. MADD, whose “Mission Statement” was amended a few years ago from preventing drunk driving to including preventing underage drinking, is adamantly against lowering the age to 18. But, as with their run-in with our military leaders, this powerful group has suddenly been confronted with a another formidable enemy.

College Presidents Seek Debate on Drinking Age

Associated Press, Aug. 18 - College presidents from about 100 of the nations best-known universities, including Duke, Dartmouth and Ohio State, are calling on lawmakers to consider lowering the drinking age from 21 to 18, saying current laws actually encourage dangerous binge drinking on campus.

The movement called the Amethyst Initiative began quietly recruiting presidents more than a year ago to provoke national debate about the drinking age.

“This is a law that is routinely evaded,” said John McCardell, former president of Middlebury College in Vermont who started the organization. “It is a law that the people at whom it is directed believe is unjust and unfair and discriminatory.”

But even before the presidents begin the public phase of their efforts, which may include publishing newspaper ads in the coming weeks, they are already facing sharp criticism.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving says lowering the drinking age would lead to more fatal car crashes. It accuses the presidents of misrepresenting science and looking for an easy way out of an inconvenient problem. MADD officials are even urging parents to think carefully about the safety of colleges whose presidents have signed on.

“Its very clear the 21-year-old drinking age will not be enforced at those campuses,” said Laura Dean-Mooney, national president of MADD

The statement the presidents have signed avoids calling explicitly for a younger drinking age. Rather, it seeks “an informed and dispassionate debate” over the issue and the federal highway law that made 21 the de facto national drinking age by denying money to any state that bucks the trend.

But the statement makes clear the signers think the current law isn’t working, citing a “culture of dangerous, clandestine binge-drinking,” and noting that while adults under 21 can vote and enlist in the military, they “are told they are not mature enough to have a beer.” Furthermore, “by choosing to use fake IDs, students make ethical compromises that erode respect for the law.”..

Duke President Richard Brodhead declined an interview request. But he wrote in a statement on the Amethyst Initiatives Web site that the 21-year-old drinking age “pushes drinking into hiding, heightening its risks.” It also prevents school officials “from addressing drinking with students as an issue of responsible choice.”

(Chuck) Hurley, (CEO) of MADD, has a different take on the presidents.

“Theyre waving the white flag,” he said.

visit our website at http://www.duilawdefense.com